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Academic discussions on compliance sometimes remind me of a
story about Mahatma Gandhi: when asked what he thought of Western
civilization, Gandhi replied, &quot;it would be a good idea&quot;. That sarcasm
might well be slapped on international environmental law: it would
be a good idea, too - if only it were complied with. But as long as it is
not (and we all know it is not), it may remain utopian - as Ren6-jean
Dupuy once put it - &quot;un droit utopique, au sens 6lev6 du terme&quot;.1
Now there is nothing wrong with utopia, and I won&apos;t apologize for
sympathizing with elevated utopianiSM.2 As lawyers, however, we also
have a duty to make our utopia work; in other words, to make interna-
* institute of international Law, University of Munich; formerly Legal Adviser for
Environmental Affairs, The World Bank.
1 Rj. D u p u y, Conclusions of the 1984 Workshop of the Hague Academy of Interna-
tional Law, 12avenir du droit international de Penvironnement: The Future of the Interna-
tional Law of the Environment (Dordrecht 1985), 495-514, at 503.
2 See M. P a I I e in a e r t s, La Conf6rence de Rio: grandeur ou d6cadence du drolt inter-
national de Venvironnement, Revue Belge de Droit International 28 (1995), 175, at 223,
referring to M. K o s k e n n i e in i, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of Interna-
tional Legal Argument (Helsinki 1989). For &quot;encouragement of utopian trends&quot; see also
L.A. Teclaff, The Impact of Environmental Concern on the Development of Interna-
tional Law, in: L.A. Teclaff/A.E. Utton (eds.), International Environmental Law (New
York 1974), 229, at 258. For a rather more skeptical view see H.A. L at i n, The Mirage of
International Environmental Law (forthcoming, New York 1997).
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tional law effective. Ever since the Rio Conference,3 there has been
intensive research on the effectiveness of international environmental
law and of institutions to implement it.4 One of the principal lessons
learned is that non-compliance in this field, ubiquitous as it iS,5 hardly
ever results from a premeditated and deliberate violation of treaty ob-
ligations. Empirically, the three primary reasons for non-compliance are
(1) incertitude of treaty standards; (2) incapacity of states to meet treaty
commitments; and (3) inflexibility of treaties in the face of changing
circumstances.6
If that diagnosis is correct, the appropriate therapy to improve future
compliance will n o t be coercive sanctions, but remedial measures to
deal with the specific root causes of non-compliance. By the same token,
3 Chapter 39 of Agenda 21 gave high prominence to the question of &quot;efficacy&quot; and
&apos;effective, full and prompt implementation&quot; of international environmental law; see the
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN-Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.l(vol.I), paragraphs 39.2, 39.3(a), 39.3(e), 39.8 and 39.9; and the back-
ground reports prepared on this topic, UN-Doc. A/CONE151/PC/103 (and Add.1) and
UNCED Research Papers Nos.24-35, consolidated as The Effectiveness of International
Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Existing Legal Instruments (P.H. Sand [ed.],
Cambridge 1992), and reprinted in Series III of International Protection of the Environ-
ment: Agenda 21 (N.A. Robinson [ed.], Dobbs Ferry/N-Y 1992), vol.2, 743, 1061, and
vol.3, 1343.
4 See especially the reports of the project on Implementation and Effectiveness of Inter-
national Environmental Commitments carried out from 1993 to 1996 by a team of social sci-
entists at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). For an overview
of related projects, see O.R. Young/K. von Moltke, The Consequences of Interna-
tional Environmental Regimes: Report from the Barcelona Workshop, International Envi-
ronmental Affairs 6 (1994), 348 - 371; H.K. J a c o b s o n / E. B r ow n We i s s, Strengthen-
ing Compliance with International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from
a Collaborative Project, Global Governance 1 (1995),119-148; and the panel of the Ameri-
can Society of International Law on &quot;Compliance with International Standards: Environ-
mental Case Studies&quot;, Proceedings of the 89th Annual Meeting (1995), 206-224.
5 E.g., see the report of the United States General Accounting Office, International En-
vironment: International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored, GAO/RCED-92-43
(Washington/DC 1992); H.F. F r e n c h, Making Environmental Treaties Work, Scientific
American 271 No.6 (1994), 94- 97; R.B. M i t c h e 11, International Oil Pollution at Sea: En-
vironmental Policy and Treaty Compliance (Cambridge/MA 1994) and F. L a d e n b u r g e r,
Durchsetzungsmechanismen im Umweltvblkerrecbt: &quot;Enforcement&quot; gegeniiber den Staa-
ten, Diss. Tiibingen 1996.
6 A. Chayes/A.H. Chayes, On Compliance, International Organization 47
(1993), 175-205, at 188; and see J. Stone, What Price Effectiveness?, American Society
of International Law: Proceedings of the 50th Annual Meeting (1956), 198, at 203:
&quot;No doubt it must remain a constant source of perplexity to distinguish departures from
existing rules of international law which are merely outrageous breaches, from those
which manifest inchoate legal change. But this is a perplexity with which, regrettably, we
must learn to live&quot;.
50 7a8RV 56/3
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if the focus of implementation strategies shifts from punitive treaty
enforcement7 to &quot;active treaty management&quot;,8 institutional mechanisms
will need to be re-designed accordingly. Recent developments in differ-
ent environmental regimes indicate that changes in this direction are
indeed beginning to take hold,9 as part of a process of international and
cross-sectoral social learning. While the present analysis mainly looks
at institutional innovation, these changes are likely also to affect the pro-
cess and the substance of future international law-making for environ-
mental protection.
L Institutions to Ascertain Standards
The incertitude and indeterminacy of most treaty texts is notoriouslO
and frequently deliberate - consensus often being attainable only at the
price of &quot;constructive ambiguity&quot;.11 Environmental agreements are no ex-
ception from the rule, and much of the unfinished business left over from
less-than-perfect treaty drafting is well known by the time a signed treaty
enters the ratification process, with signatories openly stating their diver-
gent interpretations. For example, when submitting the 1979 Convention
on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)12 for parliamen-
tary ratification, the German government added an explanatory note
7 E.g., see A.E. B o y I e, Saving the World? Implementation and Enforcement of Inter-
national Environmental Law Through International Institutions, journal of Environmental
Law 3 (1991), 229-245; A.W. S a in in a n, Enforcement of International Environmental
Treaties: An Analysis, Fordham Environmental Law Journal 5 (1993), 261; M.E.
O&apos;Connell, Enforcement and the Success of International Environmental Law, Indiana
journal of Global Legal Studies 3 (1995), 47-64.
8 A.H. C h a y e s / A. C h a y e s / R.B. M i t c h e 11, Active Compliance Management in
Environmental Treaties, in: W Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and International Law
(London 1995), 75 - 89; and A. C h a y e s / A.H. C h a y e s, The New Sovereignty: Compli-
ance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge/MA 1996). But see caveat by
G.W. Downs/D.M. Roche/P.N. Barsoon, Is the Good News About Compliance
Good News About Cooperation?, International Organization 50 (1996), 379-406.
9 E.g., see the new emphasis on collective &quot;measures to assist a Contracting Party to
carry out its obligations&quot; in article 23(b) of the 1992 Paris (OSPAR) Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Yearbook of Interna-
tional Environmental Law 3 (1992), 759; see E. Hey [et al.], The 1992 Paris Convention
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic: A Criticial Anal-
ysis, International journal of Marine and Coastal Law 8 (1993), 1-76.
10 Chayes/Chayes, supra, note 6, at 188-192.
11 See W. Lang, Diplomacy and International Environmental Law-Making: Some
Observations, Yearbook of International Environmental Law 3 (1992), 108, at 115.
12 International Legal Materials 18 (1979), 1442.
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stating that the treaty did not apply to radioactive substanceS13 - even
though at the time of adoption of the Convention, by the UN Economic
Commission for Europe, the Austrian delegation had formally de-
clared for the record that &quot;it went without saying that the Convention
applied to air pollution originating from nuclear power plants,,.14 Other
hidden divergencies may arise subsequently, in the process of treaty trans-
lation into different national languages, and during its &quot;domestication&quot;
and integration into different national legal systems.15
The traditional remedy for such conscious ambivalence - and the
usual consolation of lawyers when they do come across it - is reference
to the treaty&apos;s dispute settlement provisions, which are piously hoped to
yield some authoritative interpretation in the event of actual conflicts
between parties, or else to the possibility of advisory opinions by exter-
nal authorities. While none of the formal dispute settlement clauses in
environmental agreements were ever used,16 the Conferences of the Par-
ties to the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
Convention on Biological Diversity17 are known to have formally
requested (and accepted without objections) opinions from the UN Of-
fice of Legal Affairs to ascertain the meaning and legal implications of
treaty provisions.18
As a rule, however, the preferrred method of ascertaining indetermi-
nate standards under international environmental agreements have been
13 Bundestag, Drucksache 9/1119 of 2 December 1981, 14 (annotation to article 1, lit. a);
see also A. Rest, Tschernobyl und die Internationale Haftung, Versicherungsrecht 37
(1986), 609, at 613.
14 1979 Annual Report of the Economic Commission for Europe, UN Economic and
Social Council, Official Records (1979), Supplement No.12, vol.I, 21-22 (paragraph 102).
15 See K. H a n f / A. U n d e r d a 1, Domesticating International Commitments: Linking
National and International Decision Making, in: A. Underdal (ed.), The International
Politics of Environmental Management (London 1996, forthcoming).
16 See the survey of 124 multilateral instruments undertaken by the UNCED Prepara-
tory Committee, P.H. Sand (ed.), The Effectiveness of International Environmental
Agreements (Cambridge 1992), 14.
17 International Legal Materials 31 (1992), 814-887.
18 Memorandum of 23 August 1994 to the Executive Secretary of the Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change from the UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, UN
doc. A/AC.237/74/Annex, concerning article 11(3) of the Convention (arrangements
between the Conference of the Parties and the Global Environment Facility); a related
opinion was provided upon request to the secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity. See J. Werksman, Consolidating Governance of the Global Commons:
Insights from the Global Environment Facility, Yearbook of International Environmental
Law 6 (1995), at notes 101-121.
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authentic&quot; interpretations formulated or endorsed by the Contracting
Parties themselves. The Executive Body of the LRTAP Convention19 by
consensus thus adopted &quot;common understandings&quot; to define specific
terms of the 1985 Sulphur Protocol;20 so did the Conference of the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) with
regard to the 1983 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Re-
sources.21 Under the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That De-
22plete the Ozone Layer, the Conference of the Parties adopted succes
sive &quot;indicative&quot; definitions of &quot;incremental costs&quot; under article 10 and
case-by-case determinations of the term &quot;developing country&quot; under
article 5.23
In another, less well-known instance of creative treaty management, the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) may also be said to
have &quot;made&quot; international environmental law under the 1883 Paris Union
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property:24 while the Con-
vention originally protected the registered names, emblems and acronyms
of &quot;intergovernmental organizations&quot; only - and consequently, requests
for registration by the secretariats of the Convention for the Protection of
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage25 and of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) were initially declined on the grounds
that they did not represent autonomous organizationS26 - the Paris Union
19 Supra, note 12.
20 international Legal Materials 27 (1988), 707. See the interpretation of article 2,
adopted at the 7th session of the Executive Body (November 1989), UN doc.
ECE/EB.AIR/20, paragraph 22; a similar understanding had been adopted in 1985 for the
definition of &quot;transboundary fluxes&quot;.
21 Resolution 8/83 of the 22nd FAO Conference, as modified in 1989 by Resolution
5/89 (&quot;agreed interpretation&quot;); for background see Hj. Bordwin, The Legal and
Political Implications of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources,
Ecology Law Quarterly 12 (1985), 1053; and P. S a n d s, Principles of International Envi-
ronmental Law (Manchester 1995), 411.
22 International Legal Materials 26 (1987), 1550.
23 See T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions for International En-
vironmental Governance (Frankfurt 1994), 474. See also the &quot;clarifications&quot; of the terms
&quot;quarantine&quot; and &quot;pre-shipment&quot; under article 2H, as adopted by decision VI/11; Year-
book of International Environmental Law 5 (1994), 934.
24 League of Nations Treaty Series 92/17, as amended by the 1958 Lisbon Act and the
1967 Stockholm Act, United Nations Treaty Series 828/305. See the report of the 19th
session of the Assembly of the Paris Union, WIPO doc. P/A/XIX/4, paragraphs 20-25
(Geneva 1992).
25 United Nations Treaty Series 1037/151.
26 WIPO documents AB/X/12 and AB/X/32, paragraphs 29-31 (1979); P/ANIII/
2-P/CR/X/2, and P/ANIII/3, paragraphs 4-7 (1983); and P/A/XVIII/1, paragraphs 5-8 (1991).
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Assembly at its 19th session (Geneva, September 1992) adopted new
&quot;guidelines for interpretation&quot; of article 6ter of the Convention, so as to
extend its scope to any &quot;permanent entities&quot; established by intergovern-
mental organizations or international treaties; and accordingly agreed to
register the UNEP logo27 and the emblem of the 1971 Ramsar Conven-
tion on Wetlands of International Importance.28
Whereas some other international treaties (such as the Bretton Woods
instruments) have expressly entrusted their governing bodies with the
29
power of Interpretation, most environmental agreements are silent on
this point. As shown above, that did not prevent the Conferences of the
Parties from assuming such &quot;managerial&quot; competences as implied in
their institutional attributes; and even where doubts remain as to the
binding nature of Conference resolutions - as in the case of the 1973
Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)30 - the authority of the Conference to
adopt authentic interpretations of controversial treaty terms was never
challenged.31
27 Known as &quot;blue angel&quot; in Germany, where it has been used since 1978 (by agreement
between UNEP and the German Federal Environment Agency) as a commercial eco-label;
see P.H. S and, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance (World Resources
Institute 1990), at 26; and H. N e i t z e 1, Umweltzeichen, in: 0. Kimminich/H. von Lersner/
P.C. Storm (eds.), Handw6rterbuch des Umweltrechts 2 (2nd ed. Berlin 1994), 2535-2541.
28 United Nations Treaty Series 996/245.
29 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (article IX, and By-Laws section 14), of the International Development Association
(article X), the International Finance Corporation (article VIII), and the International
Monetary Fund (article VIII section 5). See E.P. H e x n e r, Interpretation by International
Organizations of their Basic Instruments, American journal of International Law 53 (1959),
341; and A. B r o c h e s, International Legal Aspects of the Operations of the World Bank,
Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 98 (1959-111), 297, at 312-315.
30 United Nations Treaty Series 993/243; see the discussion by G. B e n d o m i r - K a h I o,
CITES - Washingtoner Artenschutziibereinkommen: Regelung und Durchfiffirung auf
internationaler Ebene und in der Europaischen Gerneinschaft (Berlin 1989), at 135-163; and
generally J. Werksman, The Conferences of Parties to Environmental Treaties, in:
J. Werksman (ed.), Greening International Institutions (London 1996), 55 - 68.
31 E.g., see the definition of &quot;specimens bred in captivity&quot; by CITES Conference Reso-
lution 2.12 (1979, as amended in 1992 and revised in 1994), and the detailed &quot;definitions&quot;
in Annex 5 of Conference Resolution 9.24 (1994). Originally, CITES Conference resolu-
tions &quot;interpreting&quot; the convention could be taken by a simple majority of Parties present
and voting at the meetings. Only the new rules of procedure adopted at the 1987 Ottawa
meeting introduced the same qualified majority (two-thirds) as required for amendments of
the CITES appendices under article XV; see W. Wi I n s t e k e r s, The Evolution of CITES:
A Reference to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (4th ed. 1995), at 238, 367.
http://www.zaoerv.de
© 1996, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
780 Sand
It has been pointed out that this so-called authentic interpretation is in-
deed a form of treaty amendment - considering that even &quot;clarifications&quot;
of previously indeterminate treaty terms effectively reduce the range of
interpretative options that were available to the Parties prior to the clar-
ification.32 Consensual ascertainment of treaty standards limits the sphere
of potentially divergent auto-interpretation by states,33 and thus contrib-
utes to regime stabilization.34 But well-meaning peer interpretation may
also soften &quot;hard&quot; treaty rules (thereby weakening their effectiveness,
while ostensibly easing compliance) to accommodate offenders, albeit for
the sake of stability - Sicilian style: la legge 6 applicata a nemico, ma inter-
pretata all&apos;amico... [&quot;law is applied to the enemy, but interpreted to a
friend&quot;].
IL Institutions to Upgrade Capacity
The wide differences between states with regard to their institutional
and economic capacity to implement treaty obligations were amply docu-
mented at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and De-
velopment (UNCED),35 and reflected in A g e n d a 2 1 recommendations
to close the existing gaps, both by appropriate international mechanisms
and by technical cooperation at the national level.36 In recognition of the
structural North-South disparity in this regard, recent environmental
agreements acknowledge not only a differentiation of duties commensu-
rate with capacities but also an entitlement of countries in need to receive
assistance for treaty compliance.37
Technical assistance for the implementation of treaties (by national
law-making and administrative capacity-building) has a long-standing
tradition in several international organizations - starting with the Inter-
32 W. K a r 1, Vertragsauslegung - VertragsHnderung, in: C. Schreuer (ed.), Autoritit und
Internationale Ordnung (Berlin 1979), 9, at 24 (quoting M. V i r a I I y).
33 0. Schachter, The Nature and Process of Legal Development in International
Society, in: R.Stj. MacDonald/D.M. Johnston (eds.), The Structure and Process of Interna-
tional Law (The Hague 1983), 745, at 782.
34 G e h r i n g (supra, note 23), at 473.
35 See note 3, supra.
36 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de
Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992), vol.1, sections 8.15 and 39.9, UN doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1
(1993); see L. Giindling, Compliance Assistance in International Environmental Law:
Capacity-Building Through Financial and Technology Transfer (this volume), 796.
37 Article 4(7) of the Climate Change Convention and article 20(4) of the Biodiversity
Convention, supra, note 16.
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national Labour Organisation (ILO), which has undertaken efforts for
upgrading labour standards for the working environment;38 the World
Health Organization (WHO), for working towards harmonized sanitary
regulations;39 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for
compliance with nuclear safety standardS;40 the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), for compliance with global marine pollution
ruleS;41 the FAO Development Law Service, for natural resource laws in
accordance with applicable agreements, e.g. in the field of international
fisherieS;42 and the Legal Advisory Service of the Commonwealth Secre-
tariat, for a range of topics such as legislation to implement commit-
ments of the recipient countries under regional marine environment con-
ventions.43 Specialized training programmes and guidelines for national
implementation have been developed for several treaties, e.g., in the con-
text of the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.44 A significant
38 See the analysis of economic reasons for the non-observance of international labour
conventions, and the survey of remedial technical aid, by E.A. L a n d y, The Effectiveness
of International Supervision: Thirty Years of I.L.O. Experience (London 1966), 119-133.
On capacity-building assistance for environment-related ILO conventions see V.A.
Leary, Working Environment, in: The Effectiveness of International Environmental
Agreements (supra, note 16), 362-391.
39 See S. S h u b b e r, The Role of WHO in Environmental Pollution Control, Earth Law
journal 2 (1976), 363, at 378-392.
40 See A.0. Adede, Overview of Legal and Technical Aspects of Nuclear Accident
Pollution, in: D.B. Magraw (ed.), International Law and Pollution (Philadelphia 1991), 130,
at 140-142.
41 E.g., during the period from 1987 to 1992, IMO undertook consultancy missions for
maritime legislation (including implementation of marine pollution conventions) in 39 de-
veloping countries. On IMO-sponsored training in marine environment law see IMLI
News: Magazine of the IMO International Maritime Law Institute (Malta).
42 Continuing the systematic worldwide dissemination of agricultural legislation
initiated in 1911 by the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome; see E.S.Aben-
sour, The Legislative Research Branch of the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations, American Bar Association Journal 51 (1965), 984; P.H. Sand,
Environmental Legislation and Technical Assistance, FAO doc. RLAT 801/76/23
(1976); and periodic reports by the FAO Legal Office in the United Nations juridical
Yearbook.
43 See H.H. Marshall, The Commonwealth Legal Advisory Service, International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 21 (1972), 435; and periodic reports on assistance for
environmental legislation, in the Commonwealth Law Bulletin.
44 International Legal Materials 28 (1989), 657; see the Manual for the Implementation
of the Basel Convention (UNEP/SBC/94/1), Technical Guidelines (UNEP/SBC/94/6),
Revised Draft Model National Legislation (UNEP/SBC/94/2), and decision 11/19 on the
establishment of Regional Centres for Training and Technology Transfer, adopted in 1994
by the Conference of the Parties at its second meeting (UNEP/SBC/94/3).
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portion of the &quot;legislative assistance&quot; currently provided to developing
countries through UNEp,45 the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDp)46 and the World Bank47 IS targeted expressly or im-
plicitly to backstop existing environmental agreements. The same is true
for similar programmes carried out by non-governmental organizations,
such as the Environmental Law Service of the World Conservation
Union (IUCN),48 and the Foundation for International Environmental
Law and Development (FIELD);49 and for several ongoing international
training programmes in environmental law and poliCy.50
Voluntary funding to support the implementation of global and re-
gional environmental agreements in developing countries has been avail-
able since the 1970s under a number of technical cooperation programmes
45 See P.H. S a n d, Environmental Law in the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme, in: RJ. Dupuy (ed.), I!avenir du droit international de Fenvironnement: The
Future of the International Law of the Environment (Hague Academy of International
Law 1985), 51, at 60-63; Legal and Institutional Arrangements for Environmental Protec-
tion and Sustainable Development in Developing Countries, UNEP Environmental Law
Library No.3 (1991); and periodic reports in the UNEP Biannual Bulletin of Environmen-
tal Law (vol.3, 1996).
46 E.g., see the 1995 UNDP Annual &quot;Capacity 21 &quot; Report, paragraph 13.02: assistance
to Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger for implementation of the 1994 United Nations Conven-
tion to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Yearbook of International Environmental Law 5
(1994), 685.
47 Assistance provided to more than 60 countries in the field of environment-related law
and regulations, summarized in: Making Development Sustainable: The World Bank Group
and the Environment (World Bank: Fiscal 1994), at 64-67. Analysis of the recipient
countries&apos; &quot;implementation capacity&quot; for their international commitments is part of the
routine environmental assessments carried out for all World Bank projects; see &quot;Interna-
tional Agreements on Environment and Natural Resources: Relevance and Application in
Environmental Assessment&quot;, World Bank Environmental Assessment Sourcebook Update
No.10 (March 1996), at 3-4.
48 E.g., see C. de Klemm, Guidelines for Legislation to Implement CITES, IUCN
Environmental Policy and Law Paper No.26 (1993); and the annual reports of the IUCN
Environmental Law Programme.
49 See the FIELD Annual Review 1994-1995 (London 1995), and periodic reports in
FIELD in Brief; e.g., on assistance to the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in the ne-
gotiation and implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
50 By the United Nations University (UNU) in Tokyo, the United Nations Institute for
Training and Research (UNITAR) in Geneva, the International Development Law Institute
(IDLI) in Rome, and the International Law Institute (ILI) in Washington/DC. E.g., see
R.S.Maya, Towards More Effective Capacity-Building Programmes, United Nations
Climate Change Bulletin No.10 (1996), 4-5, on the GEF-financed UNITAR training
programme for implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(CC:TRAIN).
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and through several UNEP-sponsored &quot;convention trust funds&quot;.51 A for-
mal link between technical/economic aid and compliance with global
standards was first introduced by the 1972 World Heritage Convention,52
which offered financial support to &quot;host countries&quot; of selected heritage
sites - classified as being of global importance and concern - in return for
a commitment to their long-term protection in conformity with agreed
international criteria.53 The concept of compensating developing coun-
tries for the &quot;incremental&quot; costs of their participation in global environ-
mental agreements - including the building of local administrative capac-
ity - was spelled out by the 1990 amendments to the Montreal Protocol,
which led to the establishment of its Multilateral Fund (MPMF)54 and re-
affirmed by the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Conference, its two conventions, and
in 1994 by the restructured Global Environment Facility (GEF).55 The
annual volume of GEF project funding in support of the recipients&apos; inter-
national commitments in four focal areas (climate change, biodiversity,
international waters, and ozone depletion) is about $500 million.56 While
51 See P.H. Sand, Trusts for the Earth: New International Financial Mechanisms for
Sustainable Development, in: Lang (supra, note 8), 167, at 183.
52 Supra, note 25.
53 For background see S.Lyster, International Wildlife Law (Cambridge 1985),
208-238; and R.L. Meyer, Travaux pr6paratoires for the UNESCO World Heritage
Convention, Earth Law Journal 2 (1976), 45-81. Approximately one million dollars from
the World Heritage Fund are allocated annually for natural heritage sites.
54 See the amendments and adjustments to the Protocol (supra, note 22) adopted by
decision 11/8 at the 1990 London meeting, International Legal Materials 30 (1991), 537;
J.M. P a t I i s, The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol: A Prototype for Financial
Mechanisms in Protecting the Global Environment, Cornell International Law journal 25
(1992), 181; A. Wood, The Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal
Protocol, International Environmental Affairs 5 (1993), 335; and E.R. DeSombre/
J. Kauffman, The Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund: Partial Success Story, in:
R.O. Keohane/M.A. Levy (eds.), Institutions for Environmental Aid: Pitfalls and Promise
(Cambridge/MA 1996), 89. The annual volume of MPMF project funding is about
$150 million, the bulk of which is disbursed through the World Bank&apos;s Ozone Projects
Trust Fund.
55 International Legal Materials 33 (1994), 1283; and Section 33.14(a) of Agenda 21
(supra, note 36). See H. S 6 b e r g, The Global Environment Facility, in: Werksman (supra,
note 30), 148. As of July 1996, 156 countries had become GEF Participants.
56 For details (165 projects in over 100 countries) see the GEF Quarterly Operational
Report (Washington/DC, April 1996). By comparison, annual GEF allocations are
about six times higher than the project funding available through the UNEP Environment
Fund (current budget figures in Green Globe Yearbook 1996, 237) - though still 300 times
lower than the overall funding needs identified by the Rio Conference. See generally
WE. Franz, The Scope of Global Environmental Financing: Cases in Context, in:
Keohane/Levy (supra, note 54), 367-380.
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the bulk of these funds goes into improving the recipients&apos; performance in
complying with their current treaty obligations (including national ad-
ministrative implementation and data reporting),57 some GEF projects
also aim at enabling developing countries to meet the standards for enter-
ing environmental regimes in the future.58
Assisting other parties to comply in all these cases is not, of course, an
act of charity but a rational strategy in the collective self-interest of par-
ties expecting to reap the &quot;global environmental benefits&quot; of a treaty. Nor
is it unique to environmental regimes: precedents exist in other fields of
international relations - such as world air transport, where it has long
been recognized that technical assistance to &quot;upgrade&quot; aviation safety and
airport security in the Third World (by way of investments in technical
facilities, training and administrative capacity-building) not only serves to
improve the internal situation of recipient countries but is essential to en-
sure the functioning of a global air transport network. Technical assistance
for compliance with global standards therefore is the main focus of the
&quot;Standing Group on Implementation&quot; established by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1960.59 There are obvious analo-
gies to global environmental security.60
57 Membership in the treaties concerned is a prerequisite for MPMF and GEF project
funding in the field of ozone depletion, climate change and biodiversity; hence these funds
have an incentive effect as &quot;carrots&quot; for worldwide participation. See J.C. D e r n b a c h,
The Global Environment Facility: Financing the Treaty Obligations of Developing Na-
tions, Environmental Reporter 23 (1993), 10124-10132.
58 E.g., see the project on Ship Waste Disposal in China ($30 million) and two projects
on Ship-Generated Waste Management in the Caribbean ($18 million), which are aimed at
upgrading local technical facilities and administrative capacities to the level required for the
recipient countries to join Annex V of the 1973/78 Marpol Convention, International
Legal Materials 17 (1978), 546. Summaries of project status in GEF Quarterly Operational
Report (April 1996), at 72.
59 At the 40th session of the Council, ICAO doc. 8097 (C/926), 26-27, continuing on
a permanent basis the work of an earlier special panel on implementation established in
1956; see T. B u e r g e n t h a 1, Law-Making in the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (Syracuse 1969), 479-500 at 114 n.211.
60 See P.H. S and, International Law on the Agenda of the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development: Towards Global Environmental Security?, Nordic
journal of International Law 60 (1991), 5, at 9-18. The analogy to aviation safety was
stressed at a 1991 Washington symposium jointly organized by the United States General
Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service; see the Report to Congress
(Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs), Inter-
national Environment: Strengthening the Implementation of Environmental Agreements,
GAO/RCED-92 -188 (24 August 1992), at 11.
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One institutional dilemma arising in this context is the proliferation of
environmental agreements requiring such assistance - acute &quot;treaty con-
&quot; 61gestion which in the case of financial instruments may contribute to
chronic &quot;funding fatigue&quot;.62 Even though the GEF failed to evolve to-
wards the single super-fund for major common concerns which some of
its proponents had envisioned,63 it is already faced with competing fund-
ing demands from the constituencies of different environmental conven-
tions - reflected in the difficult negotiations for a GEF &quot;memorandum of
understanding&quot; with the autonomous Conferences of the Parties.64 The
problem really is not a new one, though: harmonization of multilateral
environmental aid policies - and coordination with the still more impor-
tant flow of b i I a t e r a I technical assistance in this field - has been on the
agenda of the Committee of International Development Institutions on
the Environment (CIDIE) since 198065 and of the OECD Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) since 1960.66 What is new here is the force-
ful intrusion of the recipients into the process of decision-making for glo-
bal capacity-building, which was once considered exclusive donor do-
main. The institutional response to this challenge, both in the MPMF
61 As diagnosed by E. B r ow n We i s s, International Environmental Law: Contempo-
rary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, Georgetown Law journal 81 (1993),
675, at 697-702.
62 See Sand (supra, note 51), at 183.
63 Attempts (by donor states) at merging the GEF with the Montreal Protocol&apos;s Multi-
lateral Fund failed at the 1992 Copenhagen meeting; see I.H. Rowlands, The Fourth
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol: Report and Reflection, Environment 35:6
(1993), 25, at 28-29. Attempts (by recipient states) at designating the GEF as financial
mechanism also for the 1994 Convention to Combat Desertification (supra, note 46) were
equally unsuccessful, and funding for projects concerning desertification is included in the
mandate of the restructured GEF only insofar &quot;as they relate to the [existing] four focal ar-
eas&quot; of the Facility (GEF Instrument, article 3, supra, note 55).
64 See We r k s in a n, supra, note 18, at note 123; and PH. S a n d, The Potential Impact
of the Global Environment Facility of the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP, in: R. Wolfrum
(ed.), Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable Means? (Hei-
delberg 1996), 479-500 at note 89.
65 Currently including 17 major multilateral and bilateral aid agencies and financial in-
stitutions; see A.S.Timoshenko, From Stockholm to Rio: The Institutionalization of
Sustainable Development, in: Lang (supra, note 8), 143, at 147; and generally D. Fair-
man/M. Ross, Old Fads, New Lessons from Economic Development Assistance, in:
Keohane/Levy (supra, note 54), 29-52.
66 Including all major bilateral aid donors and the Commission of the European Com-
munities; see the DAC Guidelines on Environment and Aid adopted in December 1991 by
the OECD Ministers of Environment and of Development Cooperation, especially No.4:
Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Global Environmental Problems (Paris 1992).
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Executive Committee and in the GEF Council, has been a rigid North-
South balance of representation and voting powers - the &quot;semicircles
syndrome&quot; W&quot;hich already characterized the Rio negotiations and which
probably is here to stay.67
III. Institutions to Cope with Change
Environmental problems are moving targets, frequently involving un-
foreseeable changes of circumstances, sometimes under crisis conditions.
To respond effectively, international environmental institutions must be
flexible enough for standards to be adjusted - and hence for compliance
to be redefined - over time. Environmental agreements therefore make in-
creasing use of review mechanisms for periodic performance assessment,68
and typically rely on accelerated adjustment procedures for &quot;technical&quot;
ruleS69 to avoid the slow and cumbersome process of diplomatic re-nego-
tiation, re-ratification and entry into force of treaty amendments. Short of
textual revisions, flexibility may also be achieved by &quot;re-interpretation&quot;,70
or by a variety of exemptions and escape clauses which serve not only as
selective incentives or &quot;carrots&quot; for laggards to Join7l but subsequently to
67 See P.H. S a n d, International Environmental Law After Rio, European Journal
of International Law 4 (1993), 377, at 389. According to article 10(5) of the Montreal
Protocol as amended by Conference decision 11/8 at London in 1990 (supra, note 54) and
confirmed by decision IV/17 at Copenhagen in 1992, the Executive Committee consists
of seven representatives of developing countries and seven from &quot;other&quot; countries, with
the chairmanship altering annually between both groups, and votes requiring a majority
of both groups; see the terms of reference of the Committee in Annex X, Yearbook of
international Environmental Law 3 (1992), 827. According to articles 16, 18 and 25(c), of
the 1994 GEF instrument (supra, note 55), the Council consists of 16 members from
developing countries and 16 from other countries, with a chairperson alternately elected
from the two groups at each semi-annual meeting, and votes requiring a &quot;double
weighted majority&quot;.
68 D.G. Victor/J. Lanchbery/O. Greene, An Empirical Study of Review
Mechanisms in Environmental Regimes, International Institute for Applied Systems Anal-
ysis, IIASA/WP-94 -115 (November 1994); see also T. M a r a u h n, Towards a Procedural
Law of Compliance Control in International Environmental Relations (this volume), 696.
69 See P C o n t i n i / P.H. S a n d, Methods to Expedite Environment Protection: Inter-
national Ecostandards, American journal of International Law 66 (1972), 37-59; and J.
S o in in e r Environmental Law-Making by International Organisations (this volume), 628.
70 Supra, notes 20-34.
71 See M. 0 1 s o n, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups (rev. ed. Cambridge/MA 1971), at 5 1; and P.H. S an d, International Economic In-
struments for Sustainable Development: Sticks, Carrots, and Games, Indian journal of
International Law 36/2 (1996) 1-16.
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ease compliance.72 Examples are the loopholes deliberately built into the
1987 Montreal Protocol (from the Third-World bonus of article 5 to the
grandfather clause of article 2/6),73 the species reservation system of
CITES,74 or the &quot;opt-out&quot; hatch of the International Sanitary Regulations
and other regimes.75 In some cases, a new by-pass not initially foreseen in
the treaty may subsequently be added to introduce a degree of flexibility;
e.g., the quota system developed under CITES to allow for exceptions
from the rigid trade ban on Appendix I species.76 Similarly, the &quot;non-
compliance procedure&quot; grafted onto the Montreal Protocol in 199077 -
later emulated by two LRTAP protocols in 1991 and 1994,78 and now
72 K. Kumme r, Providing Incentives to Comply with Multilateral Environmental Agree-
ments: An Alternative to Sanctions?, European Environmental Law Review 3 (1994)5 256.
73 Supra, note 22; see K. Vo r I a t, The International Ozone Regime: Concessions and
Loopholes?, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 17 (1992), 135.
74 Supra, note 30, articles XV, XVI, XXIII; see G. S t e w a r t, Enforcement Problems in
the Endangered Species Convention: Reservations Regarding the Reservation Clauses, Cor-
nell international Law journal 14 (1981), 429. Note that the so-called &quot;reservations&quot; against
subsequent amendments of CITES listings really are part of the Convention&apos;s &quot;opting-out&quot;
procedure, similar to &quot;objections&quot; under article 5(3) of the 1946 International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling, United Nations Treaty Series 161/72; see Ly s t e r (supra,
note 53), at 9.
75 See D.M. Leive, International Regulatory Regimes: Case Studies in Health, Me-
teorology and Food 2 (Lexington/MA 1976), 461-484.
76 Supra, note 30; see D.S. F a v r e, International Trade in Endangered Species: A Guide
to CITES (Dordrecht 1989), at 51, 95,127; and M. WI I d e r, Quota Systems in International
Wildlife and Fisheries Regimes, Journal of Environment and Development 4 (1995), 55.
77 Decision 11/5 and Annex III adopted on an interim basis at the second (London)
meeting of the Parties (supra, note 54) and finalized by decision IV/5 and Annex IV at the
fourth meeting (Copenhagen 1992), Yearbook of International Environmental Law 3
(1992), 819. See P. S z 6 11, The Development of Multilateral Mechanisms for Monitoring
Compliance, in: Lang (supra, note 8), 97, at 99; M. K o s k e n n i e in i, Breach of Treaty or
Non-Compliance?, Reflections on the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol, Yearbook of
International Environmental Law 3 (1992), 123 -162; and H.M. S c h a I I Y, The Role and
Importance of Implementation Monitoring and Non-Compliance Procedures in Interna-
tional Environmental Regimes, in: W Lang (ed.), The Ozone Treaties and their Influence
on the Building of International Environmental Regimes (Austrian Federal Ministry for
Foreign Affairs 1996), 82-92.
78 Adopted pursuant to the 1979 Convention (supra, note 12): Article 3.3 of the 1991
Geneva Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds
(VOCs), International Legal Materials 31 (1992), 568; article 7 of the 1994 Oslo Protocol
on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, International Legal Materials 33 (1994), 1542;
and the LRTAP Executive Body&apos;s decision on &quot;structure and functions of the Implementa-
tion Committee, as well as procedures for its review of compliance&quot;, Yearbook of Interna-
tional Environmental Law 5 (1994), 771. See the comments by Sz6ll (supra, note 77),
at 103, and M. Koskenniemi, New Institutions and Procedures for Implementation
Control and Reaction, in: Werksman (supra, note 30), 236.
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contemplated for at least three further environmental regimes (climate
change, hazardous wastes, and desertification)79 - affirms the power of
the Contracting Parties to make their own evaluation of what constitutes
compliance, and (arguably) even to grant exemptions from the strict ap-
plication of treaty rules.80
Common to many adjustment devices of this kind is their reliance on
expert advisory bodies as a &quot;feedback loop&quot; to chart and justify subse-
quent course corrections, taking account of scientific-technological
progress.81 While pre-Stockholm and pre-Rio pipe dreams of a global en-
vironmental research and assessment institution did not materialize,82
most major environmental regimes have since been equipped with advi-
sory facilities of their own - either using governmentally designated ex-
79 On the development of a &quot;multilateral consultative process&quot; under article 13 of the
Framework Convention on Climate Change see H.E. 0 t t, Elements of a Supervisory
Procedure for the Climate Regime (this volume), 732. On recent proposals for a &quot;mecha-
nism for monitoring implementation and compliance&quot; under article 19 of the 1989 Basel
Convention (supra, note 44), see 1. R u in in e I - B u I s k a, Implementation Control: Non-
Compliance and Dispute Settlement Procedures: From Montreal to Basel, in: Lang (supra,
note 77), 51-57. On similar proposals for &quot;Procedures to Resolve Questions on Implemen-
tation&quot; under article 27 of the 1994 Convention to Combat Desertification (supra, note 46),
see the report of the 8th session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on De-
sertification (Geneva, February 1996), especially UN doc. A/AC.241/WG.II(8)/L.5. See
also section 23(l) of the 1993 Lucerne Declaration of Environment Ministers in the
UN/ECE region, calling for the development of non-compliance regimes under environ-
mental conventions; Yearbook of International Environmental Law 4 (1993), doc.9; and
generally W L a n g, Compliance Control in International Environmental Law: Institu-
tional Necessities (this volume), 685.
80 E.g., the &quot;temporary relief&quot; granted to five East European countries at the 12th meet-
ing of the Montreal Protocol&apos;s Implementation Committee (Vienna, November 1995); see
D.G. V i c t o r, The Early Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol&apos;s Non-
Compliance Procedure, IIASA Executive Report ER-96-2 (International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis 1996), at 28 - 31, 40; and J. We r k s in a n, Compliance and Tran-
sition: Russia&apos;s Non-Compliance Tests the Ozone Regime (this volume), 750.
81 See the comparative survey by L.A. Kimball, Treaty Implementation: Scientific
and Technical Advice Enters a New Stage, American Society of International Law: Studies
in Transnational Legal Policy No.28 (Washington/DC 1996).
82 See the proposals by A. C h a y e s, International Institutions for the Environment, in:
J.L. Hargrove (ed.), Law, Institutions, and the Global Environment (Dobbs Ferry/N-Y &amp;
Leiden 1972), at 1-26; and by the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Gov-
ernment, International Environmental Research and Assessment: Proposals for Better Or-
ganization and Decision Making (New York 1992). For critical reviews of what was (and
was not) accomplished, see E. R o d e n b u r g, Eyeless in Gaia: The State of Global Moni-
toring (World Resources Institute 1991); and B. G o s o v i c, The Quest for World Environ-
mental Cooperation: The Case of the UN Global Environment Monitoring System (Lon-
don/New York 1992).
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pert bodies and networks (such as EMEP for acid rain&apos;83 or STAP for
GEF84), or by recourse to specialized external bodies (such as ICES for
the marine environment&apos;85 and the UN/ECOSOC Expert Committee for
the transport of dangerous goodS86), sometimes non-governmental ones
(such as the IUCN Commission on National Parks and Protected Ar-
87
eas, and the ICSU Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research88). To be
sure, the mandate of experts tends to be qualified as consultative only, and
is usually filtered through state-controlled structures of governance; but
there is no doubt that expertise can (and ought to) drive policy-making
and policy change in international institutionS89- which is why some of
the more influential expert groups have drawn criticism for their lack of
83 See the 1984 Protocol to the 1979 LRTAP Convention (supra, note 12) on Long-Term
Financing of the Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-
Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP), International Legal Materials 24
(1985), 484; and H. D o v I a n d, Monitoring European Transboundary Air Pollution, En-
vironment 29:10 (1987), 10.
84 The Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP), already set up during the GEF
pilot phase, was reconfirmed by article 24 of the Instrument for the Establishment of the
Restructured Global Environment Facility (supra, note 55).
85 See the 1964 Copenhagen Convention for the International Council for the Explora-
tion of the Sea (ICES), United Nations Treaty Series 652/237. ICES (originally established
in 1902) provides scientific advice on fisheries management and marine pollution matters to
several regional fisheries conventions, including the 1978 Ottawa Convention on Future
Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, the 1980 London Conven-
tion on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North-East Atlantic Fisheries, and the 1982
Reykjavik Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean; texts
in: I. Rummel-Bulska/Osafo (eds.), Selected Multilateral Treaties in the Field of the Envi-
ronment 2 (Cambridge 1991), at 60, 107, 157.
86 Established by ECOSOC Resolution 645/G(XXIII) of 26 April 1957, the Commit-
tee lays down recommended technical standards (known as the &quot;UN orange book&quot;) for all
air, sea and land regimes governing the international carriage of dangerous goods - includ-
ing the UN hazard classification system which also is the basis of annex III of the 1989
Basel Convention (supra, note 44).
87 For the selection of natural heritage sites under article 13(7) of the 1972 World Her-
itage Convention (supra, note 25); see also the United Nations List of National Parks and
Protected Areas, periodically issued by the IUCN Commission pursuant to ECOSOC
Resolution 713 (XXVII) of 22 April 1959.
88 For scientific advice (under the auspices of the International Council of Scientific
Unions) in the context of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, pursuant to the 1972 London Conven-
tion for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, International Legal Materials 11 (1972), 251;
and articles 10-12 of the 1991 Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection, International
Legal Materials 30 (1991), 1461; see K i m b a I I (supra, note 81), at 17, 223, 235.
89 See E.B. H a as, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in Interna-
tional Organizations (Berkeley 1990).
http://www.zaoerv.de
© 1996, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
790 Sand
transparency (in the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission,90 and
in the technical committees of the International Organization for Stan-
dardization9l) or for pursuing their own special interests (in the
UNEP/WMO Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change92). Yet, on
the whole - and notwithstanding a pattern of transnational solidarity
among &quot;epistemic communities&quot; in this field93- there is little or no evi-
dence of outright technocratic tendencies in contemporary environmental
regimes.
There are, however, other risks in a &quot;flexible&quot; approach to implemen-
tation, attractive as it may be for treaty management. First, the new
&quot;fluid model&quot; of environmental regimes - envisaged as &quot;a rolling process
of intermediate or self-adjusting agreements that respond quickly
to growing scientific understanding,&gt;94 - inevitably leads to a certain
open-endedness of commitments.95 If treaty standards can be modified
90 See L e i v e (supra, note 75), at 375 - 541; D.A. K a y, The international Regulation of
Pesticide Residues in Food, American Society of International Law: Studies in Trans-
national Legal Policy No.13 (1976); E. C h r i s t e n s e n, Pesticide Regulation and Interna-
tional Trade, Environment 32:9 (1990), 2; and L. R o s in a n, Public Participation in Inter-
national Pesticide Regulation: When the Codex Commission Decides, Who Will Listen?,
Virginia Environmental Law journal 12 (1993), 329-365.
91 On environment-related work of ISO technical committees see R.D. Hunter, Stan-
dardization and the Environment, International Environment Reporter 16 (1993), 185; and
PH. S and, To Treaty or Not To Treaty?, A Survey of Practical Experience, American So-
ciety of International Law: Proceedings of the 87th Annual Meeting (1993), 378, at 380; and
N. R o h t - A r r i a z a, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International Organization for
Standardization and Global Law-Making on Trade and the Environment, Ecology Law
Quarterly 22 (1995), 479-539.
92 See S.Boehmer-Christiansen, Scientific Uncertainty and Power Politics: The
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Role of Scientific Advice, in:
B.I. Spector [et al.] (eds.), Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) (London 1994),
181-198; id., Global Climate Protection Policy: The Limits of Scientific Advice, Global
Environmental Change 4 (1994), 140 and 185, at 190-200.
93 See J.G. Ruggle, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,
International Organization 29 (1975), 557, at 570; P.M. H a a s, Do Regimes Matter?, Epis-
temic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control, International Organization 43
(1989), 377; and i d., Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Environ-
mental Cooperation, in: V. Rittberger [et al.] (eds.), Regime Theory and International
Relations (Oxford 1993).
94 J.T. Mathews, Redefining Security, Foreign Affairs 68 (1989), 162, at 176.
95 Sand (supra, note 27), at 36.
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without formal amendment, governments cannot be sure of the treaty
obligations they assume at the moment of signature and ratification -
what is effective compliance today may be either irrelevant or non-com-
pliance tomorrow. Secondly, liberal use of devices to facilitate compli-
ance (such as exemptions and escape clauses) tends to undermine the
credibility - and even jeopardize the legitimacy - of a treaty regime,
as illustrated by the history of catch quotas and &quot;scientific permits&quot;
under the International Whaling Convention96 and of ivory trade quo-
tas under CITES.97 Possibly the most effective insurance against this
risk is transparency of decision-making, to avoid any suspicion that
flexible alternatives to treaty enforcement might benefit the special inter-
ests of free-riders. One obvious way to institutionalize such transpar-
ency - and to prevent environmental regimes from becoming &quot;a threat
to the democratic process&quot;98 is to provide for appropriate public access
and accountability. It is no coincidence that the recent institutional
for this purpose which are now spreading to most multilateral
development agencies - the new procedures for information disclosure,99
96 Supra, note 74; see P.W. B i r n i e, The International Regulation of Whaling (Dobbs
Ferry/NY 1985); id., International Legal Issues in the Management and Protection of the
Whale: A Review of Four Decades of Experience, Natural Resources journal 29 (1990),
903; D.D. C a r o n, Governance and Collective Legitimation in the New World Order,
Hague Yearbook of International Law 6 (1993), 29, at 37-44; and G. Rose/G. Paleo-
k r a s s i s, Compliance with International Environmental Obligations: A Case Study of the
International Whaling Commission, in: J. Cameron [et al.] (eds.), Improving Compliance
with International Environmental Agreements (London 1996), 148-175.
97 Supra, note 30; see W i I d e r (supra, note 76), at 62 - 68; M.J. G I e n n o n, Has Inter-
national Law Failed the Elephant?, American journal of International Law 84 (1990), 1;
E.B. B a r b i e r [et al.] (eds.), Elephants, Economics and Ivory (London 1990); and J. B o d -
d e n s H o s a n g, Trade with Endangered Species, Green Globe Yearbook 1 (1992), 59- 69.
98 Heeding a warning by K. Kaiser, Transnational Relations as a Threat to the
Democratic Process, International Organization 25 (1971), 706; see K. Raustiala, De-
mocracy, Sovereignty, and the Slow Pace of International Negotiation, International Envi-
ronmental Affairs 8 (1996), 3-15.
99 E.g., see the 1993 World Bank Procedures BP 17.50 on Disclosure of Operational
Information, Yearbook of International Environmental Law 4 (1993), 872; and the Global
Environment Facility&apos;s collection of Implementing Agencies Policies on Information Dis-
closure and Consultations, GEF/C.3/Inf.7 (Washington/DC 1995), reproducing the texts of
policy statements by UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank on public information and par-
ticipation in GEF operations.
51 Z 56/3
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NGO participation,100 and the establishment of &quot;Inspection panels&quot; for
compliance controll0l - were all spearheaded by the environmental
movement.
Conclusions
So far, I have presented these trends in institutional terms, in keeping
with my assignment to address perspectives in institution-building, and in
deferenceto the rampant &quot;new institutionalism&quot; of contemporary regime
theory.102 In all likelihood, however, the &quot;managerial model&quot; of compli-
ance103 now evolving in environmental regimes will also have repercus-
sions well beyond the institutional machinery of these regimes. It is worth
recalling that substantive legal norms continue to be an essential struc-
tural element of regime definitions104 - even though &quot;regime theorists
100 E.g., see I.F.I. S h i h a t a, The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations,
Cornell International Law journal 25 (1992), 623 - 64 1; D. Wi r t h, Reexamining Decision-
Making Processes in International Environmental Law, Iowa Law Review 79 (1994), 769; S.
C h a r n o v i t z, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Or-
ganization, University of Pennsylvania journal of International Economic Law 17 (1996),
331-357; K. Conca, Greening the UN: Environmental Organizations and the UN
System, in: T.G. Weiss/L. Gordenker (eds.), NGOs, the UN and Global Governance
(Boulder/CO 1996), 103 -119; and H. F r e n c h, The Role of Non-State Actors, in: Werks-
man (supra, note 30), 251-258.
101 See IBRD Resolution 93-10 of 22 September 1993 on the World Bank Inspection
Panel, International Legal Materials 34 (1995), 503; LRI. Shihata, The World Bank In-
spection Panel (Oxford 1994); D.D. Bradlow/S.Schlemmer-Schulte, The World
Bank&apos;s New Inspection Panel: A Constructive Step in the Transformation of the Interna-
tional Legal Order, Za6RV 54 (1994), 392; and D.D. B r a d I o w, International Organiza-
tions and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, Virginia jour-
nal of International Law 34 (1994), 553. On the subsequent establishment of similar
mechanisms in the Inter-American Development Bank and the African Development Bank,
see D. H u n t e r / A. M c C r a e, Multilateral Lending Activities, Yearbook of International
Environmental Law 5 (1994), 291.
102 O.R. Yo u n g, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless
Society (Ithaca 1994); and id., Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environ-
mental Experience (Hanover/NH 1995), at 6 n.9. See also W. Lang, Regimes and Orga-
nizations in the Labyrinth of International Institutions, in: K. Ginther [et al.] (eds.),
V61kerrecht zwischen normativem Anspruch und politischer Realitat: Festschrift ftir Karl
Zemanek zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin 1994), 275-289.
103 Chayes/Chayes, supra, note 8.
104 See the &quot;consensus definition&quot; by S.D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in: S.D. Krasner (ed.), International
Regimes (Ithaca 1983), at 2: &quot;International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given
http://www.zaoerv.de
© 1996, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
Institution-Building to Assist Compliance 793
find it hard to say the L-word&quot;105 - and that substantive law-making is
inevitably part of the functions of a regime. It may even be argued that a
certain amount of certified non-compliance is helpful, since it enables the
international regime to flex its law-making muscles.106 At any rate, the
emergence of institutions for active treaty management is bound to have
significant normative implications. Over and above the basic duty to com-
ply with the terms of a treaty as signed and ratified (pacta sunt servanda),
at least three consequential duties may thus be identified in recent envi-
ronmental agreements:
(1) to accept peer-reviewed compliance assessments imposed by the in-
stitution established for implementation purposes;107
(2) to accept compensatory arrangements for compliance assistance to
disadvantaged parties, through the institution designated for financial Pur-
poses; and
(3) to accept future regime adjustments by the institution legitimated
for that purpose - virtually amounting to a new obligation for govern-
ments to take part in a pre-ordained learning process.108
issue area&quot;. In a recent reformulation, they are defined as &quot;social institutions consisting
of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the
interaction of actors in specific issue-areas&quot;; see M.A. Levy/O.R. Young/M. Ziirn,
The Study of International Regimes, European journal of International Relations 1
(1995), 267-330.
105 Chayes/Chayes, supra, note 6, at 195 n.64.
106 See the somewhat provocative suggestion by D.G. V 1 c t o r, The Montreal Protocol&apos;s
Non-Compliance Procedure: Lessons for Making Other International Environmental Re-
gimes More Effective, in: Lang (supra, note 77), 58, at 74: &quot;International agreements could be
much more effective at influencing state behavior if they were designed to produce more
non-compliance, leading to more extensive use of non-compliance procedures&quot;.
107 The draft &quot;Principles of International Law for Sustainable Development&quot; prepared
for the 4th session of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development include principle
19 (&quot;monitoring of compliance with international commitments&quot;) formulated as an obliga-
tion of states to accept collective supervision of their compliance with agreed norms. This
obligation takes the form of specific duties to disclose and communicate information; to
tolerate verification and in some instances inspection; and generally to cooperate in multi-
lateral monitoring procedures involving the participation of other states and, in a growing
number of cases, of non-state actors. See the Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Iden-
tification of Principles of International Law for Sustainable Development (Geneva, 26-28
September 1995), UN Division for Sustainable Development: Background Paper No.3,
paragraphs 155-160 (April 1996).
108 Sand (supra, note 27), at 36; and E. Ploman, Global Learning: Concept and
Applications, in: E. Brown Weiss (ed.), Environmental Change and International Law
(Tokyo 1992), 459-478.
http://www.zaoerv.de
© 1996, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
794 Sand
To end on a lighter note, let me express these consequential duties in a
metaphor drawn from game theory: It is no secret that the negotiation and
implementation of environmental agreements has a lot in common with
gambling.109 In &quot;collaboration games&quot; of this kind, f a i r p I a y i n t h e
s a I o o n can be ensured only if all players follow certain rules of the
game. As a minimum, these rules should comprise: (1) instead of the fic-
titious &quot;honour system&quot; of traditional diplomacy,110 acceptance of verifi-
able disclosure rules to prevent cheating; (2) instead of the fictitious
11
sovereign equality&quot; of all players, acceptance of quantifiable handicap
rules to compensate for differences in capacity;111 and (3) instead of the
109 On the relevance of game theory models (such as prisoners&apos; dilemma, stag hunt,
Rambo) to some environmental regimes see K.G. Maler, The Acid Rain Game, in:
H. Folmer/E. van Irland (eds.), Valuation Methods and Policy Making in Environmental
Economics (Amsterdam 1989), 229-236; M. Efinger/H. Breitmeier, Verifying
a Convention on Greenhouse Gases: A Game-Theoretic Approach, in: J.C. di Primio/
G. Stein (eds.), A Regime to Control Greenhouse Gases: Issues of Verification, Monitor-
ing, Institutions (Forschungszentrum JiAich 1991), 59-68; S.Barrett, International
Environmental Agreements as Games, in: R. Pethig (ed.), Conflicts and Cooperation
in Managing Environmental Resources (Berlin 1992), 11, and the comments by
H. Folmer, ibid., at 36; H. Folmer [et al.], Interconnected Games and International
Environmental Problems, Environmental and Resource Economics 3 (1993), 313-335;
H. Ward, Game Theory and the Politics of the Global Commons, Journal of Conflict
Resolution 3 7 (1993), 203; 0. Ta h v o h e n / V. K a i t a I a / M. P o h j o I a, A Finnish-Soviet
Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements,
journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24 (1993), 87; J. H e i s t e r, Who
Will Win the Ozone Game? On Building and Sustaining Cooperation in the Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Kiel Working Paper No.579
(Institute of World Economics 10/93); Gehring (supra, note 23), at 34-38, 403-404;
J. Heister [et al.], Economic and Legal Aspects of International Environmental Agree-
ments: The Case of Enforcing and Stabilising an International C02 Agreement, Kiel
Working Paper No.711 (Institute of World Economics 1995); and R.O. Keohane, Re-
marks to the 1995 ASIL panel (supra, note 4), at 217-218.
110 L.A. Kimball, Forging International Agreement: Strengthening Intergovern-
mental Institutions for Environment and Development (Washington 1992), at 43.
111 1 realize that my saloon metaphors are getting mixed up here with golf, badminton,
polo and horse-racing - but then these are &quot;collaboration games&quot;, too.
112 In a different context, I have referred to this kind of game-like international arrange-
ments (which are not a prl*Ori beneficial or onerous to any one participant, but offer a fair
chance of future benefits and hence make participation more attractive than non-participa-
tion) as &quot;cubean&quot; - kybiia being the ancient Greek word for throwing dice, which is also
the root of the Talmudic term qitbbiya for gambling; see P.H. Sand, Report of the 1994
Research Session of the Hague Academy of International Law, in: M. Bothe/P.H. Sand
(eds.), Environmental Policy: From Regulation to Economic Instruments (Dordrecht
1995), 75-113, at 80.
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fictitious expectation of each player to &quot;win&quot; the game, acceptance of a
fair chance of future gains or losses.&apos; 12 Since the stakes in international
environmental games are high indeed, it seems all the more worthwhile to
inject some new legal order into the anarchy of the saloon.113
113 International collaboration games are usually assumed to operate under conditions
of anarchy, if not anomie; see O.R. Young, Anarchy and Social Choice: Reflections on
the International Polity, World Politics 30 (1978), 241; A. S t e i n, Coordination and Col-
laboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in: S.D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes
(Ithaca 1983), 115-140; K. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses
and Strategies, World Politics 38 (1986), 1; and R. Ax e I r o d / R.O. K e o h a n e, Achieving
Cooperation Under Anarchy, ibid., 226. See, however, the recent rediscovery of &quot;social
consensus rules&quot; (which would qualify the anarchy assumption) by K. B i n m o r e, Game
Theory and the Social Contract: Playing Fair (Cambridge/MA 1994), at 35; and K.J. A r -
row, Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge, American Economic Review
84:2 (1994), 1, at 5 (&quot;the rules of the game are social&quot;).
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